
Emergency Plan Part 1
Policy Document
Version 9.0
May 2026
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Owner: |
Spelthorne Borough Council |
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Maintenance: |
Applied Resilience |
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Author: |
Applied Resilience |
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Next Review Date: |
March 2027 subject to change depending on new emergency planning measures proposed for West Surrey |
Spelthorne Borough Council, Knowle Green Council Offices, Staines- Upon- Thames, TW18 1XB

The table below outlines the key activities that need to be carried out immediately once the plan has been activated. This list is not exhaustive and other actions may be necessary
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Immediate Actions |
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Notification |
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AR will usually receive initial notification from Surrey County Council (SCC) Emergency Management & Resilience Team (EMRT). Be advised that notification of incidents may also come from other unofficial sources including employees, external bodies, the media and the public; these must be logged and verified by contacting SCC EMRT or Surrey Police. Start Incident Log and record any actions/decisions including rationale behind them. Contact Applied Resilience, if not already notified (details can be found in the Emergency Contacts Directory) |
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Information Gathering/ Tactical Considerations |
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· Is a Tactical Co-ordination Group (Silver) being set up? If so, is this virtual (e.g. a teleconference or physical, or both)? · Are Incident Liaison Officers (ILOs) required? If so, where? · Is there a cordon, how large is it and is there a map (use Resilience Direct)? · Is an evacuation taking place or likely? · Is an emergency assistance centre (EAC) required, and if so, what kind – if a rest centre then SBC will be expected to lead. · Even if an EAC is not required - are people going to be cared for in-situ and if so, is a Welfare Teleconference being called by SCC? · Are there implications for Depot Operation Services, Environmental Health or other departments? · Is a vulnerable people search required? Please refer to the SLRF Vulnerable People plans · Is there damage to buildings or associated structure and have building control been notified/deployed? |
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Actions |
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· Contact key departments, including the Incident Management Team and arrange a meeting to discuss the Council’s response to the incident. · Dispatch Incident Liaison Officers (ILOs) to the TCG if necessary and await further information from them. Keep in contact with ILOs for updates on the situation and requests to the Council. (Contacts in Emergency Contacts Directory) · Determine if the Emergency Borough Emergency Coordination Centre (BECC) is needed (See BECC Plan) · If a BECC is opened, determine whether you will act as the BECC Coordinator or appoint another BECC-Coordinator to act in this role. (see BECC Plan for full details) · Contact a member of the Communications Team to update them with the details of the incident, ask them to prepare/draft a holding statement and monitor media · Consider notifying Members. · Begin gathering staff to support the BECC (or task others to do this) |

Immediate Action Table 3
Table of Contents 5
Overview of Plan Structure 8
1.0 Introduction 10
1.1 Aim 10
1.2 Objectives 10
1.3 Audience and Scope 10
1.4 Ownership, Maintenance and Review 11
1.5 Testing and Exercising 11
2.0 Community Risk Register and Types of Emergencies 12
3.0 Civil Contingencies Act (2004) 16
4.0 What is a Major Incident? 17
5.0 Who is involved in Emergency Response? 18
5.1 The Incident Emergency Management Team (IMT) 18
5.2 The Incident Liaison Officer (ILO) 19
5.3 Elected Members 19
5.4 Command, Control and Coordination (C3) 19
5.5 Operational Command (Previously referred to as ‘Bronze’) 19
5.6 Tactical Command (Previously referred to as ‘Silver’) 19
5.7 Strategic Command (Previously referred to as ‘Gold’) 20
5.8 Lead Agency 21
5.9 Information Sharing 21
5.9.1 Non-Sensitive Information 21
5.9.2 Potentially Sensitive Information 21
5.9.3 Personal Information 21
6.0 Phases of an incident 22
6.1 Activation and Response 22
6.2 Recovery 22
7.0 Overview of Activation 23
8.0 Response Phase: Where? 24
Borough Emergency Coordination Centre (BECC) 24
8.1 BECC Location 24
8.2 Considerations when opening the BECC 24
An assessment of whether to open the BECC will be influenced by: 24
9.0 Response Phase: SBC Duties to Respond 25
9.1 County or Borough Responsibility? 27
10.0 WELFARE 28
10.1 Evacuation 28
10.2 Support in-situ 28
10.3 Emergency Assistance Centres (EACs) 28
10.4 Rest Centre (Borough Lead) 28
10.5 Survivor Reception Centre (Police Lead) 28
10.6 Friends and Family Reception Centre (Police Lead) 28
10.7 Community Assistance Centre (CommAC) (Borough Lead) / Humanitarian Assistance Centre (HAC) (County Council Lead) 29
10.8 Homelessness 29
11.0 COMMUNICATION 30
11.1 With Elected Members 30
11.2 With the Public 30
11.3 Communicating with staff 30
11.4 Alternative Emergency Communications Systems 30
12.0 Media Management 31
12.1 Coordination with other organisations 31
12.2 Spokesperson 31
12.3 Media Centre 31
12.4 Media monitoring 31
12.5 Statements 31
12.6 Full statements 32
12.7 Informing staff and members 32
12.8 Local media enquiries 32
12.9 Press conference/briefings 32
12.10 Key messages and question and answer sheet 33
12.11 Dealing with complaints 33
12.12 Transfer of media operations 33
12.13 Mutual aid 33
13.0 Response Phase: Requirements and Resources Available 34
13.1 Logging 34
13.2 Mutual Aid 34
13.3 Community Groups 34
13.4 Military Aid to the Civil Authority (MACA) 34
14.0 Staff Welfare 35
14.1 Health and Safety 35
14.2 Lone Working 35
14.3 Brief and Debrief 35
14.4 Post-Incident Report 35
15.0 Finance 36
15.1 Responsibilities 36
15.2 Insurance 36
16.0 Recovery 37
16.1 Standing down, debriefing and Psychological First Aid (PFA) 37
16.2 Psychological First Aid 37
16.3 Recovery Phase 37
Appendix A 39
Overview of Plan Structure To support the operational response, this plan is divided into two parts.

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The aim of the plan is to outline the response of Spelthorne Borough Council (SBC) in the event of an emergency within the borough and provide useful operational detail, procedures, and protocols to facilitate an effective response.
The objectives of the plan are:
· To define the management response structure;
· To provide guidance for the deployment and co-ordination of the borough’s resources;
· To define and specify activation procedures; and
· To define and specify roles and responsibilities of SBC and other responding agencies.
This plan is aimed at all those likely to be involved in a response to an Emergency or Major Incident impacting SBC. This plan covers the generic aspects of SBC’s response to civil emergencies. It does not cover the following:
· Specific information and detail that is otherwise detailed in other plans, this may be:
o An SBC internal plan (e.g. the Borough Emergency Co-ordination Centre Plan),
o A multi-agency plan (e.g. the Surrey Major Incident Plan or Surrey LRF Excess Deaths Plan), which can be obtained from Resilience Direct.
o The flow chart on page 4 summarises plan linkages.
· Business Continuity arrangements, such as
o Loss or denial of access to an SBC site (such as the Council Offices)
o Loss of staff
o Loss of ICT
N.B: In some cases, a business continuity disruption will occur at the same time as a civil emergency, for example during a wide scale loss of electricity or water supply. In this instance, both the Emergency Plan and Business Continuity arrangements may be activated by the Chief Executive, a member of the Management Team or the Incident Management Team.
· Small-scale out of hours incidents (such as noise complaints, minor traveller incursions or other small-scale issues that fall outside of the scope of the Civil Contingencies Act and associated regulations and guidance) should be managed by normal day-to-day arrangements within the Council.
This Emergency Response Plan acknowledges that climate change is an increasingly significant factor influencing the scale, frequency and interaction of risks faced by the Council and its communities. National assessments identify a range of climate-related hazards, including flooding, extreme heat, severe storms, snow and ice, drought, wildfire, and indirect risks to infrastructure, food, water, and energy security. While the Council’s core emergency response procedures covering preparation, operational response, and recovery remain consistent, climate change may intensify these hazards, create more complex and concurrent incidents, and place additional strain on the councils services, infrastructure and vulnerable groups. By recognising these challenges, the Council commits to ensuring that its emergency management arrangements remain flexible, coordinated and resilient, supporting effective multi-agency working and the protection of communities in a changing risk environment.
This plan is owned by SBC. Applied Resilience (AR) are responsible for this plan’s creation, review, testing, exercising and maintenance. A full review of this plan will be undertaken every two years or in the event of a large organisational or legislative change. It should also be reviewed as a result of lessons identified following an incident. Version control must be maintained whenever any changes are made to this plan (see Appendix O).
This plan should be tested in a variety of ways. Examples include tabletop exercises, full live exercises and training. The plan will also be tested in live incidents. After the plan has been tested, all learnings should be incorporated.
A comprehensive training and exercising schedule is available from AR.
This plan has been created to facilitate an SBC response to an emergency in relation to risks as outlined in the Surrey Community Risk Register (CRR). The Surrey CRR is created and managed by Surrey’s Local Resilience Forum and outlines the risks within the County, based on the National Risk Assessment and National Risk Planning Assumptions. The Surrey CRR is also published to provide public information about these risks within the County, and the control measures in place to mitigate their impact. The Register has been published in response to the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Further information can be accessed through the Surrey County Council website:
Risks have been assessed for the likelihood of the event happening (assessed by Central Government) and the potential impact that it may have within the county (assessed locally by a multi-agency Risk Assessment Working Group on behalf of the Surrey Local Resilience Forum) using the Risk Matrix below:

Figure 1: Diagram of Risk Matrix
The types of major emergencies (risk rating as identified in Surrey Community Risk Register) that the Council could expect to be involved in are listed below. This is list is composed and reviewed by the SLRF Risk Assessment Working Group.
Risk Rating - Very High:
· National Electricity Transmission - A total national blackout due to the loss of the GB national electricity transmission system.
· Fluvial Flooding - A significant river flood event or series of concurrent events across multiple geographic regions following a sustained period of heavy rainfall.
· Surface Water Flooding - Surface water flooding in a large metropolitan area caused by a warm unstable atmosphere.
· High Temperatures and Heatwaves - Five consecutive days with maximum temperatures exceeding 35°C.
· Low Temperatures and Heavy Snow – Multiple regions of the UK subject to low temperatures and snow.
· Severe Space Weather – A severe space weather event lasting for one to two weeks with impacts including regional electricity blackouts.
· Pandemic Influenza - An unmitigated pandemic with an unassumed transmission route and a high attack rate, with 4% of symptomatic infections requiring hospital.
· Emerging Infectious Disease – Outbreak originating outside of the UK with cases occurring amongst returning travellers and their close contacts.
Risk Rating - High:
· Wildfire – A sustained and widespread extreme wildfire requiring protracted multi-agency attendance over 4-7 days with a significant impact on responder resilience and business as usual activities.
· Major Social Care Provider Failure – Wintertime cascading failure of a major domiciliary care provider and multiple minor domiciliary care providers across multiple local authorities.
· Food Supply Contamination – A major contamination incident involving a microbiological pathogen in the food chain.
· Storms – Storm force winds affecting multiple regions for at least 6 hours during a working day.
· Poor Air Quality - Poor air quality event with high pollution concentrations.
· Major Outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease - Infected animals which are not yet exhibiting clinical signs are sold or moved to other premises before the disease is detected, resulting in multiple, widely dispersed outbreaks.
· Major Outbreak of highly pathogenic Avian Influenza - An outbreak of a highly virulent strain of HPAI where disease is introduced into multiple large-scale poultry businesses, through direct or indirect contact with wild birds.
· Public Disorder – Large scale public disorder at sites in a single city or multiple cities, occurring concurrently over several days.
Risk Rating - Medium:
· Rail Accident - A rail accident-causing casualties and fatalities, damage to property and infrastructure within the affected area and potential evacuation of those affected.
· Accident Involving High Consequence Dangerous Goods-A Road tanker containing dangerous goods are involved in an accident leading to a fire/explosion.
· Aviation Collision - An airborne collision involving two commercial aircraft.
· Malicious Drone Incident - The malicious use of a single drone at one major airport in the UK.
· Simultaneous loss of all fixed and mobile forms of communication - As a result of a hazard materialising, such as a severe storm or flooding, all mobile and fixed-line (landline & internet) connections are lost immediately.
· Failure of Gas Supply Infrastructure - A technical failure or accident leading to significant loss of UK gas supplies.
· Radiation Exposure from Transported, Stolen or Lost Goods - Accidental exposure to radioactive sources which may have been stolen, lost or transported by a legal owner without proper regard to radiation safety regulations.
· Accidental fire or explosion at an onshore major hazard (COMAH) site - A major fire and/or explosion occurs at a COMAH site that produces, stores or uses significant amounts of flammable or explosive substances.
· Accidental fire or explosion at an onshore major accident hazard pipeline - Fire or explosion at a gas pipeline following ignition of flammable gas under high pressure.
· Accidental work related (laboratory) release of a hazardous pathogen - An infectious influenza type biological pathogen is inadvertently released from a containment laboratory in an urban area.
· Reservoir / Dam Collapse - A reservoir or dam collapse without warning resulting in almost instantaneous flooding.
· Water Infrastructure Failure or Loss of Drinking Water - Failure of water infrastructure or loss of drinking water caused by the complete and relatively sudden loss of piped water supply or the degradation of the piped supply such that it is unfit for human consumption even after boiling.
· Major Fire - A major fire resulting in significant loss of life or injury.
· Volcanic Eruption - Volcanic ash incursions for up to 25 days resulting in sporadic and temporary closures of significant parts of UK air space.
· Earthquake (UK) – Earthquake activity that results in ground shaking with an intensity of 7 or above on the European Macro seismic Scale (EMS) that causes damage to buildings and infrastructure.
· Drought - Drought as a result of a lack of rainfall over several years, leading to water shortages.
· Major Outbreak of African Horse Sickness - An infected horse is imported and bitten by midges, which carry the virus to other horses. By the time AHS is identified, it is well established in geographically dispersed midge populations around the UK.
· Major Outbreak of African Swine Fever - Incursions of an acute strain of ASF into the feral pig population, which spreads before detection to domestic and commercial pig farms.
· Major Outbreak of Plant Pest (Agrilus Planipennis) - An outbreak in a mature, mixed woodland, which has remained undetected for five years. Initial surveillance shows that the beetle has spread beyond a 100 x 100m area, and it is found that the spread has occurred over multiple other sites.
· Industrial Action (Firefighters) - A national fire strike in England for a continuous 8-day period with loss of life directly attributable to a weakened response by individual fire and rescue services, and reputational impact on the Government.
· Industrial action (Prison Staff) - Industrial Action by prison officers leading to significant safety and security issues in prisons in England and Wales
· Industrial Action (Fuel Supply) - Actual or threatened significant disruption to the distribution of fuel by road, including as a result of industrial action by fuel tanker drivers.
· Reception and integration of British Nationals arriving from overseas - Reception and integration of destitute/vulnerable British Nationals who are not normally resident in the UK and are unable to be accommodated by family/friends.
Risk Rating - Low:
· Insolvency Affecting Fuel Supply - A fuel refinery, importation, storage or distribution company becomes insolvent.
· Radiation Release from Overseas Nuclear Site - Accident at an overseas nuclear site with impacts that reach the UK.
· Major Outbreak of Plant Pest (Xylella Fastidiosa) - An outbreak of Xylella found in an area containing 3-5 plant nurseries and evidence of possible spread of the bacterium on plants and plant products to multiple premises across the UK.
· Industrial Action (Public Transport) - Strike action by key rail or London Underground staff (e.g., signallers) resulting in the total shutdown of very significant amounts of the national rail network.
District & Borough Lead Agency Role
· From the list above, Districts and Boroughs are listed as being the Lead agency for Earthquakes only.
· As the lead agency it would be expected that the Council can provide a representative to chair any Tactical Coordinating Groups and any Strategic Coordinating Groups that take place following an earthquake.
This plan should remain flexible enough to be able to respond to any of the emergencies above. This plan is supported by internal and LRF Hazard specific plans. In the appendix, speed sheets can be found on some of the specific hazard plans.
The Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) 2004 and associated regulations and guidance is the key legislation governing emergency planning and business continuity. The chief requirement of the CCA 2004 is to maintain plans to ensure that, if an emergency occurs or is likely to occur, the Council can deliver its functions so far as necessary or desirable for the purpose of preventing the emergency, reducing, controlling or mitigating its effect, or taking other action in connection with it.
Spelthorne Borough Council, as a Local Authority, is classed as a Category 1 responder. Category 1 responders are the organisations at the core of emergency response. They include the emergency services, the Environment Agency and NHS bodies.
Category 1 responders are subject to all the civil protection duties outlined below:
In addition to the final duty on enabling external business continuity management, the CCA 2004 also requires local authorities to be able to continue providing an acceptable level of service of day-to-day services, even during an incident.
The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 establishes a single framework for civil protection in the United Kingdom. The framework describes integrated emergency management and comprises six related activities: anticipation, assessment, prevention, preparation, response and recovery.
Part 2 of the Act deals with emergency powers. It permits the introduction by Government of temporary special legislation to help deal with the most catastrophic of emergencies. Part 2 of the Act is not covered in this document.
The principal mechanism for the Council to participate in multi-agency co-operation under the Act is the Surrey Local Resilience Forum (SLRF) that meets at least once every quarter. It has no legal standing but acts as a mechanism to:
· Write multi-agency plans identifying roles and responsibilities.
· Lay out multi agency command and control structures
· Support warning and informing
· Assess Risk
· Facilitate multi-agency training and exercising
The Cabinet Office defines a Major Incident as:
An event or situation, with a range of serious consequences, which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency responder agencies.
a) ‘Emergency responder agencies’ describes all Category one and two responders as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and associated guidance;
b) A Major Incident is beyond the scope of business-as-usual operations, and is likely to involve serious harm, damage, disruption or risk to human life or welfare, essential services, the environment or national security;
c) A Major Incident may involve a single-agency response, although it is more likely to require a multi-agency response, which may be in the form of multi-agency support to a lead responder;
d) The severity of consequences associated with a Major Incident are likely to constrain or complicate the ability of responders to resource and manage the incident, although a Major Incident is unlikely to affect all responders equally; and
e) The decision to declare a Major Incident will always be a judgment made in a specific local and operational context, and there are no precise and universal thresholds or triggers. Where LRFs and responders have explored these criteria in the local context and ahead of time, decision makers will be better informed and more confident in making that judgment.
Declaration of a Major Incident is an important indication to other responding agencies that an incident has met the defined threshold and, in many plans, the term acts as an important trigger point for agency actions.
Any Category 1 responder can declare a major incident. However, it is good practice to have agreement from senior officers.
In practice, the emergency services usually take the lead in declaring a Major Incident, however SBC has this prerogative, which may be used for slower build incidents, such as flooding.
Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP). JESIP has been set up to ensure joint working works effectively. There are five principles: Co-location, Communication, Co-ordination, Joint Understanding of Risk, Shared Situational Awareness and should be used in all civil emergencies. For more information see the JESIP website.
Within Spelthorne Borough Council, it is inevitable that most staff will be involved either directly or indirectly with responding to a Major Incident. This is because even those with unspecified roles, or those who continue their normal duties, will be supporting the response by maintaining the normal functions of the council, perhaps having to take up tasks from other officers whilst human resource is stretched (Business Continuity).
There are, however, pre-identified roles that will be at the forefront of the Council’s response. The Incident Management Team (IMT) will be coordinating efforts and will ensure that SBC is responding effectively in its own right, and in conjunction with other agencies. A full description of other agencies involved, and their role, can be found in part 2, page 48.
The IMT will co-ordinate SBC’s response to a Major Incident. The IMT will consist of the following roles:
Chief Executive (or nominated deputy)
Deputy Chief Executives
Customer Services Manager
Emergency Planning Lead
Applied Resilience (The council’s resilience contractors)
A member of the communications team
A loggist (consider Committee Services)
While at times it may be challenging to assemble all members of the IMT, during a major incident, the Council should try to prioritise its statutory response duties.
The IMT are responsible for strategic decision making, influencing the short-term response and longer-term recovery, and also the provision of the Council’s normal services wherever possible. The impact, scale, and profile of the incident will denote the level at which the response is managed. All members of IMT are expected to provide staff as required to support the response.
In terms of determining the strategic direction of the response, there are two options depending on the nature of the incident:
1. Form an Incident Management Team separate to the Borough Emergency Control Centre and agree the strategic direction (receiving updates from/passing instructions to the BECC Coordinator/Comms Team/Representative on the multi-agency Strategic Coordinating Group)
2. The response is coordinated by Applied Resilience with the Emergency Planning Lead overseeing actions with the option of changing to a MS Teams or opening the BECC if the incident becomes protracted/more complex.
Normal council governance and delegation of powers will remain in place. However, a more formal structure is required in an incident. It is important all decisions and rationales are recorded. This can be done in an individual logbook or IMT minutes/decision log.
During an incident, all responding officers must maintain a comprehensive record of all events, decisions, reasoning behind key decisions and actions taken. The Chief Executive should nominate an information manager responsible for overseeing the collection/keeping of the records after the incident.
The ILO will attend Tactical Briefings at the Multi Agency Tactical Coordination Group (TCG) (usually based near the scene of the incident) and receive up-to-date information from other responding partners on the situation as it unfolds. They will also take requests for Council assistance/involvement to pass on to the Tactical lead (e.g. Applied Resilience or the BECC Coordinator) or the BECC.
Often during an incident, members of the local community turn to elected officials for support and guidance. The roles of Elected Members during an incident are as follows:
· Enhance local community liaison with the council
· Assist in the promulgation of key response messages
· Focus community concerns in a constructive manner
· Encourage and support recovery teams working within their community
· Visiting affected residents
· Assisting with debrief sessions with the community
Events, activities and information will develop and change rapidly during a Major Incident. Misinformation and inaccuracies can be highly detrimental to the effectiveness of the emergency response and, in extremis, can potentially threaten the public’s or responding organisations’ safety, cause extreme distress or jeopardise legal proceedings.
For this reason, Elected Members, as with SBC staff, are expected to follow strict information security principles during the incident and ensure that any public messages are agreed by the IMT or the BECC.
The C3 structure for emergency response is the same at both an internal organisational level, and at a multi-agency level. There are three levels of command and control: Operational, Tactical and Strategic. The titles do not convey seniority of service or rank but represent a function. See Figure 2 page 19 for diagrammatic view of command and control.
This is the front-line level of response for each of the responding agencies at the scene(s) of a Major Incident. Each service will nominate operational leads who will control and deploy the resources available and implement the decisions of the tactical commander. Critical services operating heavily at the operational level include Streetscene, Housing & Independent Living, Environmental Health, Building Control and Customer Services.
Tactical command determines priorities in allocating resources, plans and co-ordinates when a task will be undertaken and obtains resources as required. Tactical commanders should not become involved with the activities at the scene but concentrate on the overall management of an incident. Tactical commanders implement the strategy set out by strategic command.
Spelthorne Borough Council will send Incident Liaison Officers (ILOs) to multi-agency tactical command, known as the Tactical Coordination Group (TCG) to represent the Borough and be the primary gateway for multi-agency partners into the SBC. The ILO will also receive up-to-date information on the situation as it unfolds. They will take requests for Local Authority assistance/involvement to pass on to the Borough Tactical Control
The Council’s own tactical command will be in the Borough Emergency Coordination Centre (BECC), with the Tactical Lead for the council being the BECC Coordinator. Applied Resilience has delegated authority from the Council to act in the Tactical Lead role where required and most likely where an incident does not necessitate the opening of the BECC.
The multi-agency strategic command process is via a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG); this could be a virtual group or hosted at a physical location depending on nature and scale of the incident. Other emergency services and local authorities will nominate senior officers to attend the SCG to agree upon policy and strategic direction for managing the incident. Surrey Police will usually chair the strategic group meetings, depending on the incident/lead agency. The Incident Management Team (IMT, see Section 5.1 page 17) will act as internal SBC strategic command and provide the link and representation on the SCG.
Figure 2 shows the C3 structure as it relates to both SBC internally (left-hand column) and at a multi-agency level.
The Lead Agency will depend on the nature of an incident. In many cases, Surrey Police will initially take a lead role. In the case of a major fire, however, Surrey Fire and Rescue will act as Lead agency. Once the immediate dangers have subsided, in most cases the Local Authority will formally take on the lead as the Lead Agency during the recovery phase. It is difficult to predict at what point this will happen in any given emergency, as the decision will be heavily influenced by context.
Non-sensitive information passes freely between the Council and other Category 1 and 2 responders as part of a general process of dialogue and co-operation. This facilitates effective decision making about how to plan and what to plan for. The Council does not normally pursue formal information requests when dealing with Category 1 and 2 responders. However, the use of non-sensitive information may be limited by duties of confidence, by other enactments, or by contract.
Not all information can be shared without restriction. Emergency Planning will coordinate requests for potentially sensitive information in accordance with Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and the Cabinet Office Emergency Preparedness guidance.
The general presumption is that information should be shared where this is necessary for Category 1 and Category 2 responders to perform their civil protection duties. However, information may be withheld or controlled where disclosure would prejudice national security or public safety, prejudice legitimate commercial interests, or breach applicable data protection legislation, including the UK GDPR and Data Protection Act 2018.
Information relating to vulnerable persons may need to be shared at the time of an incident, or for emergency planning and response purposes, where this is necessary, proportionate and lawful. See section 5.9.3.
Professional advice should be sought from the Council’s Data Protection Officer where personal data, special category data, or other sensitive information is involved. Where sensitive information is provided or received, it must only be used for the purpose for which it was requested or disclosed, unless further use is lawful and appropriately authorised.
Under the CCA 2004, Category 1 and 2 responders are required, at the time of an incident, to provide details of Vulnerable People that they provide a service to, and that are expected to be impacted by the incident. The Data Protection Act 2018 permits this. The SLRF ‘Identifying Vulnerable People in an Incident Plan, Part 1’, and the Council’s ‘Identifying Vulnerable People in an Incident Plan, Part 2’ detail the protocols and mechanisms for the sharing of the information.
The response to any emergency may be divided broadly into phases, regardless of the scale:
The initial response will involve the protection of life, property and the environment, and will be primarily the responsibility of the emergency services, supported by local authority and other organisations. SBC’s role will be focused on mobilising staff, such as Incident Liaison Officers, building control officers, Streetscene officers and staff involved in supporting the evacuation and shelter of residents (e.g. through opening or supporting Emergency Assistance Centres). In the period of consolidation, the emergency services will consolidate procedures and measures implemented in the initial response, whilst local authority and others begin to play an ever-increasing role by providing a variety of support, services and resources on request.
Once the risk to life or property has abated and the emergency services have begun to scale down their operations, including withdrawal from the scene, the local authority will be fully involved with organising and implementing recovery measures. Please note the recovery will start before the official handover from the response stage and the recovery phrase. Lead agency status for recovery will normally be with Surrey County Council, however in some incidents, particularly where they are isolated within the Borough, SBC may be expected to take on this Lead Agency role. This discussion with SCC needs to happen at an early stage.
If a Major Incident has occurred and you require guidance, please go immediately to the Operational Plan. (Part 2 page 38)
The following table summarises the process through which SBC’s Emergency Plan will be activated. The first person to receive a call (most likely AR via SCC EMRT Duty Officer or a member of MAT) should use the quick reference guide in the operational plan to aid them. (Part 2 page 38)
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Standby Triggers |
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If any of the below circumstances apply, the Council should enter ‘Amber Alert’. The Incident Management Team should be notified and put on ‘stand-by’ in case the situation escalates further i.e. to an emergency as defined under the CCA 2004.
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o There is a requirement to extend awareness of an incident beyond a specific department; o There is a requirement to give the team(s) involved or affected priority and or enhanced services; or o There is a requirement to provide additional resources to support the team(s) involved. |
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Full Activation |
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In Hours |
Out of Hours |
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During office hours, awareness of an incident or impending incident may come from several different, or simultaneous sources such as; SCC EMRT Duty Officer, SBC member of staff or elected member, local news, members of the public including via social media. Regardless of how SBC becomes aware of an incident or impending incident, it is crucial that this information is rapidly passed to the Incident Management Team and Applied Resilience. |
Monday- Thursday 17:00-09:00 / Friday 16:45-Monday 09.00 Out of hours it is more likely that SBC are alerted to an incident or possible incident from the emergency services, usually via SCC’s Emergency Management and Resilience Team. |
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Note: In both circumstances, notification of incidents may come from any unofficial source including employees, external bodies, the media and the public. Any notification from an unofficial source must be logged and verified at the earliest opportunity by contacting SCC EMRT or the police. |
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On Call |
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The Council has standby arrangements with Applied Resilience taking tactical management of the incident until the IMT and BECC are established. |
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Notification |
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It is highly likely that in the event of a Major Incident being declared, the Borough Emergency Coordination Centre (BECC) will be the focal point of SBC’s response. Below is a summary of important aspects of the BECC. Full details can be found in the SBC BECC Plan.
Room 108, the Goddard Room and offsite locations will be used depending on the incident.
Temporary BECC – Room 101 if available/appropriate.
However, there may be instances where Knowle Green is not available or physical BECC is not feasible (e.g. during a pandemic). In these cases, a virtual BECC should be considered. Details can be found in the BECC plan.
· The apparent long-term or serious implications for SBC and/or the community;
· Pre-planned or anticipated incidents/events;
· The need for a coordinated response of two or more Council departments;
· A protracted incident likely to last for more than 24 hours;
· Out of hours when it is difficult to co-ordinate activities of responding staff;
· Major disruption to SBC; and
· The need to support adjoining boroughs/districts faced with an emergency.
The primary responsibilities of SBC during a Major Incident are summarised in the following table.
|
Responsibilities |
Area of Response |
|
Activating and staffing the BECC as required in support of the management of the incident.
|
General |
|
Support the emergency services on request
|
General |
|
Liaise with the coroner office to provide emergency mortuary capacity when existing mortuary provision is exceeded. |
General |
|
Lead the recovery effort providing support and aftercare to persons living within the borough until a state of normality or ‘new’ normality is returned.
|
General |
|
Assist people in need
|
Welfare |
|
Provide immediate shelter to anyone made homeless as a result of an incident (Rest Centre). Support immediate shelter and welfare for survivors not requiring medical support and their families and friends via Emergency Assistance Centres.
|
Welfare |
|
Provide medium to longer-term welfare of survivors or evacuees/homeless.
|
Welfare |
|
Provide help lines to act as a public information service for residents and staff in liaison with the lead emergency service. |
Corporate (Communications) |
|
Maintain and restore SBC’s services and facilities |
Corporate (Business Continuity)
|
|
Release information that has been agreed by the Police to the media and give advice to the public.
|
Corporate (Communications) |
|
Facilitate the inspection of dangerous structures to ensure they are safe for emergency personnel to enter |
Operational |
|
Clean-up of pollution, facilitate the remediation and reoccupation of areas affected by an emergency.
|
Operational |
|
Provide investigating and enforcement officers under the provision of the Food and Environment Protection Act 1985 as requested by Defra
|
Operational |
|
Assisting with management of parks and open spaces.
|
Operational |
|
Provide repairs, demolition and clearance services
|
Operational |
|
Waste Collection
|
Operational |
|
CCTV Support (Where available)
|
Operational |
Table 3: SBC Duties to Respond
In the event of an incident involving more than one Borough or District, the Chief Executives of the affected area may nominate a lead authority or define responsibility for co-ordination of the major incident response. In incidents where two or more of the Boroughs are affected, or for cross border incidents with the response largely within Surrey, the County Council will assume the lead, supported by the Districts/Boroughs.

The
responsibilities between Borough and County Council can sometimes
become confused. Table 4 outlines the responsibilities for
each organisation.
Table 4: Roles and Responsibilities between Surrey County Council and SBC
As a result of the impact of a Major Incident, the emergency services may advise the public to evacuate their homes/workplaces/schools or to stay indoors and take shelter. The emergency services will, normally, request evacuation and define the area to be evacuated. The police or Surrey Fire and Rescue Services (SFRS) will normally request the evacuation of an area in consultation with other responding agencies. SBC may be called upon to assist the police by providing transport, shelter and accommodation. SBC and the TCG will agree on the best centre. This will depend on the circumstances. Despite the request for evacuation, there may not be the need to establish a Rest Centre. An assessment by a Housing Officer may be appropriate. Members of the public may be able to self-evacuate or for a small group it may be more appropriate to arrange Bed and Breakfast/Hotel accommodation.
It may be determined that an evacuation is not necessary or possible and instead the response will focus on providing support to people where they are. This is a common occurrence for severe weather, such as snow or heatwave (although some evacuations of residents may still take place).
SCC Emergency Management Team may determine that a Welfare teleconference, involving all relevant agencies (including the Districts and Boroughs) to discuss the need for, and most appropriate way of providing, support.
Providing shelter is one of the main responsibilities of the Borough Council during a Major Incident. Under the Local Government Act 2000, Local Authorities have a responsibility to ensure the economic, social and environmental well-being of the community that they serve. The 1989 Local Government Housing Act and the 1996 Housing Act place statutory duties on Local Authorities to provide temporary accommodation for residents rendered homeless because of an emergency. Under Surrey Local Resilience Forum (SLRF) Emergency Assistance Guidance, there are four types of assistance centres. Below is a summary of those centres - full details can be found in the SLRF Emergency Assistance Centre Plan.
The most commonly used EAC. It is a building designated or taken over by the Local Authority for the temporary accommodation of evacuees and homeless indirectly affected, with the potential for overnight facilities.
Set up in the immediate aftermath of an emergency where survivors not requiring acute hospital treatment can be taken for short-term shelter, first aid, interview and documentation.
A secure area set aside in the immediate aftermath of a disaster for gathering family and friends arriving at the scene (or location associated with an incident, such as at an airport or port).
Both are one-stop-shops for survivors, families, friends and all those impacted by a disaster, through which they can access support, care and advice. The distinction between the two is the scale at which they operate. CommACs are set up for very localised incidents. Areas of Surrey badly affected by Flooding in 2013/2014 opened CommACs to provide support to the local community. HACs are much larger and may be necessary when there is a wider area (or areas) impacted by a catastrophic event. A HAC was opened in London in 2005 after the July 7 terrorist attacks.
In an incident, SBC has a duty to respond to emergency homelessness.
1. Where a small number of people/families are affected, alternative accommodation can be sourced through SBC’s Housing Team (please see Emergency Contacts Directory)
2. For large scale homelessness (e.g. police cordon/evacuation) a rest centre will be set up. This will support those residents able to find alternative accommodation to do so, ensure provision of support and alternative interim accommodation for those who cannot and provide support until residents can return to their homes.
Private housing residents often have insurance which will allow them to claim alternative hotel accommodation. In addition, landlords also have a responsibility to their tenants.
The Incident Management Team is responsible for ensuring appropriate communication about an incident with Members. The IMT should seek to minimise the burden on Tactical and Operational levels and be aware of the importance of information security, inappropriate political considerations or pressure and the risk of deviation from agreed messages. At the same time, Elected Members can provide valuable assistance in the supporting the council’s response and must be kept appropriately informed and supported so a consistent message can be given by all.
Communications with the public can take the form of:
o Media and press announcements (jointly with other organisations);
o Switchboard messages;
o Council website messages; and
o Appropriate social media channels.
Timely, accurate and effective communication with the public is essential for the emergency response. As such a communications representative should be present at all IMT meetings and the BECC should have representation, or very clear links with the Communications and Customer Service teams.
Messages and decisions about emergency events the council is responding to will be communicated via SpelNet and line managers. Decisions about the messages that should be communicated will be agreed by the Incident Management Team. The following teams will liaise to ensure consistent messages are disseminated via communication channels: Customer Contact, Communications & Engagement, Web and Information Team.
Spelthorne Borough Council has a duty under the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) to ensure that there is a robust and resilient telecommunications system in place, in the event of traditional methods failing. There are several ways that SBC can meet this duty including RAYNET and MTPAS. The SLRF Telecommunications Plan contains more details on how to respond to a telecommunications outage.
Any Major Incident has the potential to generate a huge amount of media interest. It is likely that members of the media will be among the first to arrive at the scene or quickly access photographs and images from the public. As such, effective media management is considered a key component of any incident response plan.
The Surrey Police Communications Department should maintain close liaison with the District and Borough Communications Officers to ensure a coordinated and consistent release of information. The incident may require the support of an SBC Communications Officer. In this case Surrey Communications group may be activated. The Borough Communications Officer should be familiar with this as detailed in the Surrey Major Incident Communication Plan. The Spelthorne Media Plan sets out the Council’s role in media issues in an emergency.
Generally, for a Major Incident Surrey Police will co-ordinate the activities of the emergency services and other agencies including the communication part of the response.
When appropriate, depending on the nature of the incident, the Communications Officer should run statements past Surrey Police Communications Team, the Fire or Ambulance service Communications Teams and Surrey County Council or the other local authority communications Teams if it is a cross-border incident. This will ensure that all statements correlate. If the SLRF Major Incident Communications Plan has been activated this will be done through the Multi-agency Information Group (MIG).
The incident will stimulate public concern and media interest; a spokesperson should be appointed for as long as the incident lasts and they should make themselves available on their mobile phone to the Communications Officer. This would usually be the Chief Executive or Leader of the Council.
The opening of a media centre must be agreed by the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG). If a media centre is required, then the lead local authority will select and obtain a suitable building.
It is necessary to monitor media output to be aware of contentious issues or inaccurate statements. Monitoring needs to be a continuous process. Any perceived problems with the information that is being broadcast should be identified and fed back to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) via the Multi Agency Information Group.
Recordings of broadcasts and press cuttings may provide useful feedback material when the response to the incident is analysed.
The Communications Officer should prepare a holding statement, to be approved by the Communications and Marketing Manager. The time that the statement is made should be logged. A ‘holding statement’ should be provided to the public and press with basic information and notification, whilst greater detail is prepared for a full press release.
If more detailed information comes through quickly, then this should be included in the first holding statement. However, the holding statement should be issued as quickly as possible and followed up with a more detailed statement as soon as possible.
The Communications Officer will then prepare a full statement for the media giving details of the incident. The statement should be signed off by the Communications Manager. (and where possible IMT) and in line with requirements of the MIG.
A full statement should outline the points below (link with Police Communications Team or Communications Team of any other lead organisation appointed):
o Summary of the event - time, place, date of incident etc.
o Extent of injury if known - do not speculate. If unsure use the term - leg, foot, arm injury. State left or right if known. If you have an accurate medical report from hospital, use their terminology. Avoid the use of words that are sensational, e.g. severed, amputated.
o Brief description of incident, using any positive points where possible.
o Quote from a senior officer/member if they are available.
o Quote and/or contact details for victims or those affected by the incident. Ensure they are happy to speak to the press.
The statement should be placed on the SpelNet, the Council’s website and an email with the link should be sent to the Customer Services Managers, MAT (to cascade) and Cllrs. Managers may wish to use Whatsapp to ensure a wide reach of the messaging. However, no confidential information should be shared on Whatsapp.
Once all enquirers have been satisfied with a press statement, dependent on the seriousness of the incident, the Communications Officers should approach the local media, which have not enquired with the information.
It is the responsibility of Surrey Police Media Office Manager/Scene Press Officer to organise and manage briefings. The first press briefing will take place shortly after the incident probably at or near the scene of the incident (a Media Liaison Point). Thereafter briefings should take place at regular intervals, as agreed with Strategic/Tactical Communication lead. At least 30 minutes’ notice should be given before briefings, if possible.
All information released at press conferences must be agreed by the Strategic Communications Manager/Tactical Media Manager (and appointed operational officer) and only authorised personnel will make statements to the media. Appropriate senior officers from the emergency services and local authorities will be expected to speak to the media at informal briefings as well as formal press conferences throughout the incident. Spokespeople must be trained to an appropriate level. It is the responsibility of each organisations media office to brief their spokespeople. Prior to any press briefings it is advised that the Media Officer (on scene) gathers all the spokespeople and their respective press officer together and agrees who is going to talk about what, identify any contentious issues and discuss how these can be dealt with.
It is essential that prior to a press briefing/conference with TV crews, the Communications and Marketing Manager has prepared a key messages, questions and answer sheet (Q and As). This will help prepare the spokesperson for any complex questions.
The BECC and IMT should ensure that these are dealt with swiftly to avoid extra media attention. It is important that the Communication and Customer Services teams keep the BECC up to date with the level and nature of complaints, reported issues and difficulties.
It is expected that in the recovery phase of most Major Incidents Surrey County Council would take over the co-ordination of communications and engagement from Surrey Police. If there are smaller incidents where SBC take responsibility.
The Surrey Communications Group have an informal arrangement in place to provide mutual support in emergencies.
Logging is a vital element of any emergency response for several reasons. Firstly, it ensures that actions are not lost and that staff handovers run smoothly. Critically, if there is a need for an inquest or enquiry after an incident it is important that you can present a written record of all the decisions you made and why you made them.
SBC may be required to give assistance to other Local Authorities responding to emergencies. Informal arrangements exist between neighbouring authorities under the Surrey Protocol for Mutual Aid in the event of a cross-boundary incident. Districts and Boroughs may want to share officer resources during emergencies; this could range from Incident Liaison Officer (ILO) level through to Strategic level staff in the BECC. The Protocol also allows for officers and equipment to be brought in to assist an affected Borough where their resources are overwhelmed. Please see Appendix A for further details on Mutual Aid.
Community groups can add value to a response and should be used where appropriate. The groups should have a single point of contacts. A member of staff should make contact and keep a running discussion of how SBC can help. The Community Wellbeing Team have the relevant contact details.
The Armed Forces’ national structure, organisation, skills, equipment and training can be of benefit to the civil authorities in managing the response to, and recovery from, major emergencies. This support is governed by the Military Aid to the Civil Authority (MACA) arrangements. However, it should be made clear that the Armed Forces maintain no standing forces for MACA tasks and hence, cannot make a commitment that guarantees assistance to meet specific emergencies.
There are three criteria for the provision of MACA:
1. Military aid should always be the last resort. The use of mutual aid, other agencies, and the private sector must be otherwise considered as insufficient or be unsuitable.
2. The Civil Authority lacks the required level of capability to fulfil the task, and it is unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one.
3. The Civil Authority has a capability, but the need to act is urgent and it lacks readily available resources.
All SBC staff and members have a responsibility to assist in response to an incident, whether on the scene or from the council offices. As such, the IMT have ultimate responsibility for staff welfare during an incident. Deployed staff e.g. operational staff/rest centre will be responsible to their appropriate manager. ILOs will be supported by the BECC and TCG commander. It is important that staff are aware of their reporting lines and how to report any welfare issues.
The nature of emergency situations is that the Council will generally need to respond quickly, but reasonable training and instruction will be given, and the health and safety of our staff and the public will remain our main priority. Responding staff will be provided with food and beverages throughout an incident as necessary.
Where possible, staff will not be deployed alone however given the nature of emergencies, it may be necessary to deploy lone workers. In the event of lone deployment, it is important to adhere to Lone Working Policies. The main consideration is to ensure that where staff are deployed and attend in person, they inform their relevant manager by telephone, where they are going and how long they will be. In adherence with the Lone Working Policy, staff must have a Solo Protect Device if deploying alone in an incident, which should have been arranged with Health and Safety in advance of any expected deployment.
All staff deployed in a response should undergo a brief to make them aware of the incident occurring prior to deployment and their role. This brief should include some information about the emergency.
On stand down of the plan all staff deployed in a response should undergo a debrief which may also include a psychological First Aid (PFA) session or be carried out separately. Applied Resilience are trained to assist in carrying out debrief sessions.
A post incident/exercise report should be written and include recommendations for improvement to the emergency plan and procedures going forward.
Applied Resilience will arrange this and then make the necessary changes to the Emergency Plan to ensure the recommendations that have been identified are recorded and implemented. SBC will also be invited to attend a multi-agency debrief and will be expected to attend.
The Finance Team is responsible for the following actions:
All expenditure and income associated with the emergency should be accurately recorded to enable the Head of Finance to make appropriate claims to Government Departments.
A list of purchase card holders can be found in the Emergency Contacts Directory on Resilience Direct. Officers should avoid using their own credit cards or cash. In certain circumstances, the Council can give officers authority to use their own credit cards or cash. Receipts must be obtained for reimbursement via payroll.
Scenarios may arise where an insurance claim may be made against the Council (e.g. personal injury). In all cases where insurance may be required, Health and Safety should be consulted in the first instance and Sutton LBC in the second.
It is essential that all staff are formally stood down at the end of the incident and given the opportunity to attend a debrief. This is a structured session that will enable responders to discuss the incident response, although the Council’s involvement in the incident is likely to stretch beyond this point. It is an excellent opportunity to review the existing arrangements within plans and identify ways in which they can be improved upon for the future, as well as marking the end of the response phase. SBC should be asked, or must request, to attend any joint agency debriefs taking place within other organisations.
It may be necessary to accompany the debrief discussions with some form of professional welfare support as some officers may wish for more in-depth discussions following an incident. This can be provided by a range of professionals including Surrey County Council Adult & Community Care Service and Surrey Trauma Support Service. Psychological First Aid (PFA) sessions are advised within 3-5 days of a traumatic event but can be useful at any time following the event. Applied Resilience can help organise these sessions.
Staff may not necessarily identify that they require Psychological First Aid (otherwise known as Mental First Aid) sessions and therefore managers and team members should be mindful of their colleagues. Recurring instances of upsetting dreams about the event, heightened irritability/ outbursts of anger, difficulty concentrating are some of the signs that might suggest that the individual is suffering from trauma from the event and may require further support. HR teams should have processes in place to ensure that they can support SBC staff following an emergency.
The SLRF Emergency Recovery Protocol defines recovery as “the process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency”. This phase may gradually develop during the response phase however focuses on the longer-term rebuilding of the community after an incident. Depending on the incident either SBC (for small localized incidents) or SCC (large scale incidents) will take the lead role in the rehabilitation and recovery of the community. The transition is likely to be formalised through Strategic Command and communicated to the Chief Executive (or deputy). This may occur within hours, days or weeks of the incident. Depending on the scale and nature of the incident. However, indications from SCG will be needed as early as possible, and the Borough’s representative at the SCG should report back to the Chief Executive (or Deputy) with regular situation reports giving the current status of the emergency, in order to allow the Council sufficient time to prepare for this phase. To avoid duplication, other agencies will need to be brought together to discuss priorities of action. Although not exhaustive, the Group led by the Chief Executive (or deputy) may consider the following actions:
· establishing a multi-agency recovery liaison group
· agreeing on key priorities for the future
· the composition of the Council’s recovery group.
· encouraging community representation
The role of political leadership in supporting the return to normality is vital, and the Leader of the Council is to be involved closely with the process throughout. The Leader and Mayor will play a key role in rebuilding community confidence, communication, meeting senior government representatives, and motivating the community to rebuild.
Command and control structures for the recovery phase mirror those at the response phase. A summary is shown in Figure 3 below:
![]() |
|
Version Number |
Date |
Status |
Amended By |
|
Version 0.01 |
May 2009 |
Draft plan completed - NM Comments incorporate- SM |
Nick Moon |
|
Version 0.02 |
24 July 2009 |
Formatting- LD |
LD |
|
Version 0.03 |
29 July 2009 |
Adding of Protective Markings- NM. Small Language Changes |
Nick Moon |
|
Version 0.04 |
7 August 2009 |
Notes incorporated from DCX, minor changes, reference to major flood plan, COMAH off site plans. Clarity over Safer Runnymede role. Adding media section, plan testing and maintenance, minor editing. Adding of risk register section-NM |
Nick Moon |
|
Version 0.05 |
11 August 2009 |
Formatting- LD |
|
|
Version 0.06 |
2 September 2009 |
Notes incorporated from DCX and Streetscene Manager- NM |
Nick Moon |
|
Version 0.07 |
8 September 2009 |
Amendments made following Cabinet Meeting on 7 September. Changed web address link, corrected email address and removed reference to par 4.14 |
Nick Moon |
|
Version 1.0 |
15 September 2009 |
Plan formally adopted |
Nick Moon |
|
Version 1.1 |
November 2011 |
Plan re-opened by EPO for amendment. EPO details added, contact details for key areas of response assed. Contact details for SCC changed. |
Nick Moon |
|
Version 1.2 |
November 2011 |
Plan circulated and staff comments incorporated |
Nick Moon |
|
Version 1.2.2 |
January 2012 |
Sent to MAT for approval |
Nick Moon |
|
Version 2.0 |
January 2012 |
Active |
Nick Moon |
|
Version 2.1 |
September 2013 |
Removal of contact numbers. Change in titles. Change in health R&Rs |
Nick Moon |
|
Version 3.0 |
September 2013 |
Approved by MAT |
Nick Moon |
|
Version 4.0 |
November 2015 |
Updated website links. Updated SCC Community Risk Register diagram. Enhanced voluntary support section. Enhanced military support (MACA) section. Minor changes to media policy concerning “Surrey Alert”. Addition of community groups. Addition of staff rota, recovery phase plan and standing down & debriefing. Chemical hazard info changed. Changes to language and formatting. - AB |
Aisling Brophy |
|
Version 5.0 |
November 2016 |
Updated definition of ‘Major Incident’ in line with Cabinet Office changes Minor changes to wording. Removal of reference to Highways Authority, changed to Highways England. Updated external website links. Changes to nominated Incident Liaison Officers. |
Aisling Brophy |
|
Version 6 |
January 2018 |
Applied Resilience – New Plan Format.
Minor changing to wording |
James McHugh |
|
Version 7.0 |
September 2018 |
Full review
|
Applied Resilience
|
|
Version 7.1 |
December 2018 |
Inclusion of reservoir plan appendix.
|
Applied Resilience
|
|
Version 7.2 |
November 2019 |
Updated SMIP to SLRF Emergency Response Plan; Updated distribution list to include BECC Coordinators and Communications Manager; Updated fuel plan speed sheet; BECC location details updated |
Applied Resilience
|
|
Version 8.0 |
January 2021 |
Full Review: Updated Immediate Action Table; Overview of plan structure added; Linking plans web updated; Aim updated; SLRF Risk Register added; Overview of activation table incorporated; Section included on homelessness; Added section on logging and community groups; Reference to purchase card holders being found in Contacts Directory added; IMT Aide Memoires added; Addition of PHE, Highways England and Military to the External Partners – Roles and Responsibilities section; Post-incident write-up report section added; IMT Agenda added; Guidance for ILOs during the COVID-19 pandemic added; Mass evacuation speedsheet added; Surrey major accident hazard pipelines plan speedsheet added; CBRN(E) and Hazmat Incidents speedsheet; Reservoir inundation speedsheet added; Distribution list updated. |
Applied Resilience (Ed Walker) |
|
Version 8.1 |
March 2021 |
Customer Services Manager added to initial notification; CCA Section updated to provide more detail; Reference to JESIP added to section 4; Decision-making and logging policy updated; Telecommunications section cut down due to new internal plan and reference to SLRF Telecommunications Plan added; Removal of reference to Warning and Informing Group; Debriefing wording changed to emphasise that AR will write debrief reports; HR Aide Memoire updated to include redeployment actions; Update Spelride and Cemeteries to Neighbourhood Services; Removal of Bellwin Threshold figure and replaced with web link; SLRF Excess Deaths Plan Speedsheet moved to Pandemic Plan; Risk register updated with additional detail for SBC and note about RAWG; Use of Whatsapp to inform staff added; Lone Working – addition of Solo Protect devices; Section 15.2 on Insurance added; Citizens Advice Bureau changed to Citizens Advice; Section 5.9 on Information Sharing added. |
Applied Resilience (Ed Walker) |
|
Version 8.2 |
April 2021 |
Addition of reference to COVID-19 to the risk register section. Plan signed off by MAT under the proviso of an IMT training session held in June 2021. |
Applied Resilience (Ed Walker) |
|
Version 8.3 |
October 2024 |
Interim Emergency Plan taken to MAT for approval prior to completion of this plan. |
Applied Resilience |
|
Version 9.0 |
May 2026 |
Full Plan Review Plan divided into separate policy document and Operational response document Additon in document scope regarding acknowledgement of climate change and the impact on emergencies |
Applied Resilience |